PRIDRUŽENE ČLANICE EU, KANDIDATI I «ASPIRANTI»: KOLIKE SU RAZLIKE MEĐU NJIMA I KAKO SE BRZO MOGU SMANJITI? by Dubravko Mihaljek
D. MIHALJEK: EU Entrants, Candidates and Aspirants: How Large Are the Differences...
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 56 (11) 975-995 (2005) 975
 UDK 339.923
 JEL Classifi cation O11, O40, 
  O52, P27
 Izvorni znanstveni rad
EU ENTRANTS, CANDIDATES AND ASPIRANTS:
HOW LARGE ARE THE DIFFERENCES AND HOW 
QUICKLY COULD THEY BE REDUCED?
This paper attempts to answer three questions on the status of real eco-
nomic convergence in central and eastern Europe. First, how large are the 
differences, measured by key macroeconomic indicators, between the new 
member states that joined the EU in 2004, the four EU candidates (Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Romania and Turkey) and the EU “aspirants” from southeast Europe 
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro). 
Second, how long could it take the EU candidates and aspirants to overcome 
these differences and catch up with the new member states? And third, how 
long could it take the 16 countries in central and eastern Europe to catch up 
with living standards in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain? 
Due to the complexity of cross-country comparisons, answers to these 
questions are only illustrative. It is shown that differences in terms of macr-
oeconomic indicators between the EU candidates and the new member states 
are not as large as is often thought. However, the starting position of countries 
in southeast Europe is considerably less favourable. Second, at the average 
speed of reforms exhibited by the new member states over the past 15 years, 
it would take between 1½ and 7½ years for the EU candidates and aspirants 
to reach the level of transition observed in the new member states at the time 
Dubravko Mihaljek*
* D. Mihaljek, Ph. D., Senior Economist, Bank for International Settlements, Centralbahnplatz 
2, CH-4002 Basel, Switzerland. E-mail: Dubravko.Mihaljek@bis.org. The views expressed in this 
paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the BIS. Useful comments by 
anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. First draft: 20 June 2005, Revised draft: 3 November 
2005. Rad primljen u uredništvo: 27. 6. 2005.
D. MIHALJEK: EU Entrants, Candidates and Aspirants: How Large Are the Differences...
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 56 (11) 975-995 (2005)976
they joined the EU. Converging to real per capita incomes of four southern 
members of EU-15 would take considerable longer: between 25 and 50 years 
for the new member states (with the exception of Slovenia) and EU candidates; 
and 65 years or longer for the southeast European countries.
Keywords: convergence; EU enlargement; growth; transition economies; 
EU candidates; central and eastern Europe; southeast Europe. 
1. Introduction
Since the eight countries from central and eastern Europe had joined EU in 
2004, attention of many analysts has turned towards remaining countries in the 
region. One issue that immediately arises in this context is how far behind the new 
member states are current EU candidates – Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Turkey 
– as well as aspirants from southeast Europe – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro. A related issue is how long it might take 
these countries to catch up with the new member states in terms of economic de-
velopment. Finally, how far behind the “old” EU members are the eight newcomers 
as well as the candidates and aspirants? 
Economic convergence may be divided into micro and macro categories. Micro 
convergence refers to a tendency towards the equalisation of income of identical 
factors across economies and its theoretical underpinnings are provided by semi-
nal papers of Heckscher, Ohlin and Samuelson.1 This paper will deal with macro 
convergence, which explains how aggregate variables such as per capita income or 
output per worker may converge or diverge across economies. More specifi cally, 
the paper will try to assess the speed of convergence among different European 
economies but without discussing specifi c determinants of convergence.2
Section 2 compares some standard macroeconomic and structural indicators 
for countries in central and eastern Europe and EU-15. The purpose of these com-
parisons is to assess differences in initial positions among new member states, EU 
candidates and countries in southeast Europe, vis-à-vis the less wealthy southern 
members of EU-15 such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. It is shown that, 
in terms of macroeconomic indicators, the differences between the new member 
states and EU candidates are not as large as is often thought. However, countries 
in southeast Europe are starting from a much worse position of. 
1  For an overview of the factor-price equalisation theory see any standard textbook in inter-
national trade theory (eg, Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1983).
2  For an overview of the macro convergence hypothesis in economic literature see Rassekh 
(1998).
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Section 3 discusses the speed of convergence between the new member states 
and EU candidates and aspirants. It is shown that, at the average speed of reforms 
exhibited by the new member states over the past 15 years, it would take between 
1½ and 7½ years for EU candidates and aspirants to reach the level of transition 
observed in the new member states at the time they joined EU. 
Section 4 addresses the same question, but this time from the point of view 
of all European transition economies vis-à-vis the less wealthy members of EU-
15 from southern Europe. Converging to real per capita incomes of Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain would take between 25 and 50 years for the new member states 
(with the exception of Slovenia) and EU candidates; but 65 years or longer for 
southeast European countries.
To conclude, Section 5 discusses possible downward biases to the estimated 
speed of convergence.
2. How large are the differences among central 
 and eastern European economies?
Sixteen countries from central and eastern Europe range in population from 
just 1.4 million (Estonia) to 71 million (Turkey), and in GDP from under $5 bil-
lion (Macedonia) to $300 billion (Turkey) (Table 1). Only Poland, Romania and 
Turkey have relatively large population (20 million inhabitants or more), while 
half of the countries in the region have less than 5 million inhabitants. In terms of 
GDP virtually all economies in central and eastern Europe are small. For instance, 
with a 10% larger population, Spain had in 2004 almost four times larger GDP than 
Poland, the second largest economy in central and eastern Europe. 
The relative size of economies is important when considering the speed of 
convergence. Small economies can catch up faster with the more developed ones 
in the medium term because of potentially greater institutional fl exibility. Examples 
in central and eastern Europe include the Baltic states and in particular Estonia. 
The best examples in other parts of the world are city-states such as Hong Kong 
and Singapore. But in the long term, small economies have lower growth potential 
because of smaller population, and would therefore have to sustain growth mainly 
through productivity-enhancing investment.
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Table 1
SELECTED INDICATORS FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPE AND EU COUNTRIES
 
Population   
2004
(million)
GDP             











Czech Republic 10.2 107 3.0 2.7 10.3
Hungary 10.1 100 3.9 7.2 6.3
Poland 38.2 242 3.1 4.4 19.1
Slovakia 5.4 41 4.1 7.7 13.1
Slovenia 2.0 32 3.4 6.8 10.1
Estonia 1.4 11 6.5 3.5 4.0
Latvia 2.3 14 7.4 3.2 8.5
Lithuania 3.5 22 6.7 0.5 6.0
EU candidates
Bulgaria 7.8 24 4.9 6.4 12.2
Croatia 4.4 35 4.1 3.4 13.8
Romania 21.7 73 5.3 26.0 6.2
Turkey 70.7 300 4.3 37.8 10.0
EU aspirants
Albania 3.4 8 6.0 2.7 14.4
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
3.8 8 4.9 2.0 43.2
Macedonia 2.0 5 1.3 3.0 37.2
Serbia-
Montenegro
8.1 22 4.8 40.6 18.53
Southern EU-4
Greece 11.0 205 4.3 3.4 8.9
Italy 57.8 1,681 1.3 2.5 8.3
Portugal 10.5 167 1.1 3.3 6.8
Spain 42.2 993 2.9 3.2 10.8
1 Annual average percentage change.     2 Based on labour force surveys; except Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia (registered unemployment).     3 Unemployment data for Serbia only.
Sources: Eurostat; IMF; UN Economic Commission for Europe; author’s calculations.
The best growth performance in central and eastern Europe over the past 
fi ve years has been exhibited by the Baltic states, which expanded by 6½–7½% 
per annum on average, followed by Albania (6%) and Romania (5¼%). Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro were growing by slightly 
less than 5% per annum on average. Croatia, Slovakia and Turkey were growing 
by slightly more than 4% per annum; and “mature” transition economies (the 
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Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) by 3–4%. The slowest growing 
– indeed, stagnating – economy in the region is Macedonia; even excluding the 
years of civil confl ict (2001 and 2002), Macedonia’s average growth amounted to 
just 3¼%, much less than any of its neighbours’. One should note that the period 
from 2000–04 is suitable for cross-country comparisons because of the absence of 
economic crises (with the exception of Turkey in 2001) and civil confl ict (except 
in Macedonia). Moreover, the initial transformation recessions had been completed 
by 2000, with the exception of Serbia and Montenegro, where the transition only 
just started in 2000. 
Table 2 compares macroeconomic indicators for different groups of countries in 
Europe. The difference in initial positions can be seen already from the GDP data: with 
a 50% smaller population, four “old” EU members from southern Europe produced 
three times greater GDP than all 16 countries from central and eastern Europe taken 
together. Another point to note is that, over the past fi ve years, average growth in 
central and eastern Europe was more than twice as fast as the EU-15 average. Real 
growth was on average highest in the new member states, followed closely by the 
four candidate countries. The EU aspirants – which should, other things equal, grow 
more rapidly – actually underperformed. The four southern EU members were grow-
ing even more slowly, mainly because of the poor economic performance of Italy; 
however, their growth was still faster than the average for EU-15. 
Table 2
A COMPARISION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
AND EU COUNTRIES, 20041
 Population(million)









states 73 569 4.8 4.5 9.7
EU candidates 105 432 4.7 18.4 10.6
EU aspirants 17 45 4.3 12.1 29.5
Total central and 
eastern Europe 195 1,044 4.6 9.9 14.6
Southern EU 4 122 3,046 2.4 3.1 8.7
EU 15 383 12,183 2.1 2.3 8.0
1 For countries in different groups see Table 1.    2 Annual percentage change, unweighted average 
for countries in the group.     3 Based on labour force surveys, except Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia.         
Sources: Eurostat; IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2005; UN Economic Commission for Europe; 
author’s calculations.
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Most countries in central and eastern Europe had by end-2004 cut infl ation to 
low single digits, at or below levels recorded in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain 
in recent years. But in Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia 
and Turkey average infl ation rates in 2004 were still lying between 6–12%, far too 
high for sustainable long-term growth. A major part of the challenge to sustain faster 
economic growth for both EU candidates and aspirants would therefore seem to 
lie in achieving a durable reduction in infl ation.
Regarding unemployment, average rates in the new member states and EU 
candidates look similar. But from the data in Table 1 one can clearly distinguish three 
groups of countries. In the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, 
Romania and Turkey, the unemployment rates are similar to those in Greece and 
Spain. In Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Serbia and Slovakia, unemployment 
is signifi cantly higher, ranging from 12–19%. For Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Macedonia, no labour force survey data are available. Their rates of registered unem-
ployment of 37% and 43% in 2004 appear at fi rst sight truly catastrophic. However, 
both economies have extensive informal sectors, and registering as unemployed 
provides individuals access to health care benefi ts. The rates of unemployment 
based on labour force surveys are therefore likely to be signifi cantly lower than 
35–45%. Nonetheless, the registered unemployment fi gures highlight enormous 
structural challenges facing these countries. With a large proportion of labour force 
unemployed, growth that is actually achieved is bound to be well below potential. 
At the same time, the potential for faster catch-up should be greater.  
While the above macroeconomic indicators provide some essential infor-
mation on different starting positions in central and eastern Europe, they are far 
from suffi cient to characterise the initial positions more completely, let alone to 
assess potential speed of convergence. A useful set of indicators for this purpose 
are transition indicators compiled by the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) since 1994. These indicators rank economies on a scale from 
1 (incipient development of a market economy) to 4 (developed market economy) 
according to fi ve groups of criteria: market, enterprises, fi nancial institutions, 
infrastructure (which covers energy, road and rail transportation, telecommunica-
tions and water supply) and the legal system.3 One should note that compiling these 
indicators involves a fair amount of judgment, so they should only be regarded as 
illustrative of the degree of development of market institutions. With this caveat 
in mind, the indicators for 15 central and eastern European countries in 2004 are 
shown in Table 3. No indicators are available for Turkey as it is not considered a 
transition economy.
3  The classifi cation used in this paper differs slightly from that used by the EBRD, which 
considers, under “liberalisation”, price, trade and foreign exchange liberalisation; under “enterprises 
and markets”, enterprise reform and competition policy; and under “privatisation”, small-scale and 
large-scale privatisation. Legal environment indices used in this paper were discontinued in 2002, 
when a new index was developed.
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Table 3
EBRD TRANSITION INDICATOR, 2004
 CZ HU PL SK SI EE LV LT BG HR RO AL BH MK SCG
Markets
Price liberalisation 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.0 4.3 4.3 4.0 4.0 4.0
Trade and foreign 
exchange system 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.7 4.3 3.3
Competition policy 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 3.0 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0
Enterprises
Small-scale 
privatisation 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 3.7 4.3 3.7 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.3
Large-scale 
privatisation 4.0 4.0 3.3 4.0 3.0 4.0 3.7 3.7 4.0 3.3 3.7 2.3 2.3 3.3 2.3
Enterprise reform 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.7 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.3 2.0
Financial 
institutions
Banking reform 3.7 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.3 4.0 3.7 3.0 3.7 4.0 3.0 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.3
Non-bank fi nancial 
institutions 3.0 3.7 3.7 2.7 2.7 3.3 3.0 3.0 2.3 2.7 2.0 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0
Infrastructure 3.3 3.7 3.3 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.0 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.3 2.0 2.3 2.0 2.0
Legal environment1
Commercial law 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.7 3.0 3.0 3.3 3.0
Financial regulations 3.0 3.3 3.3 2.7 3.0 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.0 3.3 1.3 1.0 2.7 1.7
Overall score2 3.7 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.2 2.8 2.4 3.1 2.5
Private sector share 
of GDP (%) 80 80 75 80 65 80 70 75 75 60 70 75 50 65 50
Note: CZ = Czech Republic; HU = Hungary; PL = Poland; SK = Slovakia; SI = Slovenia; EE = 
Estonia; LV =Latvia; 
LT = Lithuania; BG = Bulgaria; HR = Croatia; RO = Romania; AL = Albania; BH = Bosnia and 
Herzegovina; MK = Macedonia; SCG = Serbia and Montenegro.  
1 Indicators for 2002.     2 Simple average of all indicators.
Sources: EBRD (2002, 2004); author’s calculations.
As can be seen from overall transition scores (defi ned as simple means of 
11 individual transition indicators), EU candidates do not lag signifi cantly behind 
the new member states. The average overall score for the candidate countries 
(3.3) is only 9% lower than the average overall score for the new member states 
(3.6). However, EU aspirants lag considerably behind the new member states and 
candidate countries – their average transition score (2.7) is 18% lower than the 
average score for the candidate countries and 25% lower than the average score 
for the new member states. 
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Another important point to note is that even the new member states have yet 
to move to standards and performance norms of mature market economies in areas 
of enterprise reform, non-bank fi nancial institutions, infrastructure and fi nancial 
regulation, areas in which their transition scores are on average much lower scores 
than for price liberalisation, trade and foreign exchange system, small scale priva-
tisation and commercial law. In other words, even for the countries that joined EU 
in 2004, it would be premature to argue – as some of these countries’ offi cials have 
done in the past – that the transition to a market economy was over. In particular, 
Slovenia’s overall transition score is lowest among the new member states and only 
marginally higher than scores for Bulgaria and Croatia.
Figure 1 shows average values of the transition indicators in each category for 
non-acceding countries (EU candidates and aspirants) as compared with the average 
for the new member states. A value lower than 100 indicates a gap vis-à-vis the new 
member states’ average; a value of 100 indicates equal starting positions; a value 
greater than 100 indicates an advantage vis-à-vis the new member states.
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Figure 1
TRANSITION INDICATORS FOR NON-ACCEDING COUNTRIES 
RELATIVE TO NEW MEMBER STATES' AVERAGE, 20041
Sources: EBRD; author's calculations
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According to the overall transition score, Bulgaria and Croatia lag about 8–10% 
behind the new member states’ average; Romania and Macedonia about 12–15%. 
The overall scores for Albania, Serbia and Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
are up to one third lower than the average for the new member states.
Like the new member states, candidate and aspirant countries have made 
greatest progress in price liberalisation and trade and foreign exchange system; the 
smallest in competition policy, non-bank fi nancial institutions and fi nancial regula-
tion. The low scores in these three areas refl ect several factors, including: (i) high 
obstacles to the entry of new fi rms to the market and inadequate implementation 
of the legislation and policy of market competition with respect to fi rms that have 
a dominant market position; (ii) the existence of a shallow securities market, the 
low level of activity of brokers and other non-bank fi nancial intermediaries, and 
the rudimentary legislative framework for the issuance of and trade in shares and 
bonds; and (iii) the inadequate and inconsistent application of the fi nancial system 
laws and regulations, in particular inadequate protection of the interests of creditors 
and owners and problems with bankruptcy laws and procedures, because of which 
legal uncertainty prevails (EBRD, 2004). 
Compared with the average for the new member states, Croatia is in a relatively 
advanced stage of enterprise, fi nancial institutions and infrastructure reforms. But as 
indicated in Figure 1, market reforms (in particular, competition policy) and legal 
reforms are still at a fairly early stage compared with the new member states.
Low values of transition indicators are statistically highly correlated (coeffi -
cient of 0.8) with the private sector share of GDP. The average private sector share 
of GDP in the eight acceding countries was 76% in 2004; in Bulgaria, Croatia and 
Romania it was 68%; and in four southeast European countries 60%. A simple 
regression shows that for each 10 percentage-point increase of the private sector 
share in GDP, the aggregate transition indicator rises by 0.34 points, i.e., by a tenth 
of the average value of this indicator in 2004 (Figure 2). In other words, a country 
such as Croatia, with a 60% share of private sector in GDP (the second lowest in 
central and eastern Europe, after Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Mon-
tenegro), might be expected to catch up in overall transition score with Poland by 
increasing the private sector share in GDP to 70%, and with Hungary by increas-
ing that share to 75%. It is interesting to note that that these private sector shares 
are not particularly high relative to those in new member states, nor should it be 
particularly diffi cult for Croatia to achieve them.
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Figure 2
EBRD TRANSITION INDEX AND PRIVATE SECTOR SHARE OF GDP
3. How long would it take to catch up with the new member states? 
How long would it take EU candidates and aspirants to close the “transition 
gap” vis-à-vis the new member states? This question is answered in two steps. 
First, for each new member state, total improvement in the overall transition score 
is calculated, and then divided by the number of years it took to achieve this im-
provement (left-hand half of Table 4). Second, for each non-acceding country, the 
difference in transition score relative to the acceding country average is calculated, 
and then divided by different “transition speeds” (last three columns in Table 4).
Sources: EBRD; author's calculations
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Table 4
PROGRESS IN TRANSITION, 1991-20041


































Czech R. 1.6 13 0.12 Bulgaria –0.20 1.3 1.7
Hungary 1.6 12 0.13 Croatia –0.28 1.8 2.4
Poland 1.3 9 0.14 Romania –0.37 2.4 3.2








10.0Slovenia 1.5 12 0.12
Estonia 2.5 13 0.19









9.6Lithuania   2.4 11 0.21
Average 1.8 12 0.16
1 Measured by the overall EBRD transition score (average of 11 individual transition indicators).   
2 Average for eight new member states (0.16 points per year).   
3 Average for the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia (0.12 points per year).
Sources: EBRD, Transition reports (1999, 2002, 2004); BIS calculations. 
The new member states have on average improved their overall transition 
score by 0.16 points per year since 1991, or 1.8 points in total. Thus, if the non-
acceding countries made progress in their transition at the same speed, it would 
take them between 1.3 years (Bulgaria) and 7.5 years (Bosnia and Herzegovina) to 
close the “transition gap” vis-à-vis the average position of the new member states 
in 2004. In the case of Croatia, it would take slightly less than 2 years to reach the 
same position in terms of the overall transition score that the new member states 
had in 2004.
One should note, however, considerable differences in the speed of transition 
among the new member states. The Baltic states had improved their transition score 
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on average 60% faster than the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. If the non-
acceding countries were to advance in their transition at the speed of the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia, it would take them from 1.7 years (Bulgaria) to 
10 years (Bosnia and Herzegovina) to close the “transition gap”. In the case of 
Croatia, the difference would not be that large, about six months.
4. How long could it take to catch up with southern EU countries?
This section discusses when and how central and eastern European countries 
might reach levels of per capita GDP in less wealthy EU members from southern 
Europe – Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.4 Specifi cally, it looks at convergence 
to 50% and 75% of the average per capita GDP in those four countries. 
Real convergence has been an issue of intense debate, with some economists 
arguing that, rather than narrowing, income gaps would widen over time, and others 
believing it would take at least a generation to close the income gap between eastern 
and western Europe (see survey in Morita, 1999). Some historical comparisons 
might be useful to put these predictions into perspective. When Portugal joined 
the EU in 1985, it had the same level of per capita GDP relative to the EU average 
(about 25%) as Croatia, Hungary and Poland in 2001. Within 15 years, Portugal’s 
per capita GDP had grown to about 50% of the EU average, even though its growth 
performance was on average considerably weaker than that of central and eastern 
European countries. Likewise, Slovenia is roughly at the same level of development 
as Greece, Ireland and Spain at the time they joined EU.5 Thus, from a historical 
perspective, several central and eastern European countries are not signifi cantly 
less developed than the less wealthy members of the EU from southern Europe.
Table 5 shows estimates of growth rates of potential GDP, population and real 
per capita GDP for 16 countries in central and eastern Europe and four southern 
European members of EU. Potential growth rates are taken from several different 
sources:
• For the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, a study by Huizinga 
et al (2002), prepared by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analy-
sis. This is one of the most detailed recent studies of the growth potential 
of European economies;
4  These economies are less wealthy in the sense that their per capita income ranged from 
50% (Portugal) to 91% (Italy) of the EU average in 2004.
5  The relatively high per capita income of Greece in 1981 largely refl ected the overvalued 
exchange rate of the drachma. After devaluation in 1982, Greek per capita income fell from 63% to 
40% of the EU average. 
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• For Slovakia, a long-term forecast by Consensus Economics (2003);
• For the Baltic States, projections by the European Commission (2002);
• For Croatia, estimates by Mihaljek (2000), revised and updated in Mihaljek 
(2003);
• For Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, 
Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey, estimates based on real growth rates 
for 2000–04 (excluding years of economic crisis or severe recession) and 
World Economic Outlook projections for 2005–06 (see IMF, 2005);
• For Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, estimates by Huizinga et al (2002) 
and the European Commission (2005). 
Estimates from these sources were assumed to hold for the period 2003–10. 
For each subsequent decade, potential growth rates were assumed to decline by 
0.25 percentage points, in line with an observed tendency of growth rates in OECD 
countries to fall over time. For Croatia, for instance, it is assumed that potential 
GDP is 5% from 2003–10; 4.75% from 2011–20; 4.5% from 2021–30; etc. Figures 
shown in the fi rst column of Table 5 are average growth rates for the nearest two 
decades, 2003–10 and 2011–20. 
Estimates of population growth are taken from the latest UN population 
projections (United Nations, 2005). They are also differentiated by decades, with 
fi gures shown in the second column of Table 5 representing averages for 2003–10 
and 2011–20.
Data on the growth rates of potential GDP and population are then used to 
project growth rates of real per capita GDP, which are shown in the third column 
of Table 5. For comparison, the fourth column shows the actual growth rates of 
per capita GDP during 1995–2003, excluding years of economic crisis or severe 
recession. Such “cleaned-up” growth rates are better indicators of the potential for 
long-term growth of per capita income than the actual historical averages, given 
that most crises or recessions in central and eastern Europe between 1995 and 2003 
refl ected continuation of structural transformation started in the early 1990s.
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Table 5
GROWTH RATES OF POTENTIAL GDP, POPULATION 




Real per capita GDP
Pro jected2
Actual        
1995–20034
Czech R. 3.4 –0.2 3.5 3.3
Hungary 4.6 –0.5 4.9 4.6
Poland 4.7 –0.1 4.8 5.1
Slovakia 5.1 –0.1 5.1 4.8
Slovenia 4.7 –0.3 4.8 3.8
Estonia 5.7 –0.9 6.1 8.2
Latvia 5.6 –0.7 6.1 6.9
Lithuania 5.4 –0.4 5.8 7.1
Bulgaria 4.9 –0.6 5.7 5.3
Croatia 4.9 –0.5 5.0 5.3
Romania 5.3 –0.3 5.7 5.7
Turkey 6.7 1.6 5.4 5.2
Albania 6.2 0.5 5.6 6.4
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
5.4 0.4 5.4 4.6
Macedonia 3.4 0.3 3.3 3.3
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
4.7 –0.3 4.8 4.4
Southern EU-4 2.5 –0.3 2.9 1.4
1 For data sources, see the main text.     2 Average for 2003–20.      3 Based on United Nations, 
World Population Prospects 2004.   4 Excluding years of crisis or severe recession.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, Huizinga et al (2002), IMF, 
United Nations and national data.
For consistency, projected growth rates of per capita GDP from Table 5 were 
also compared to the estimates derived by Morita (1999), who used two different 
growth models – a Barro model with government consumption equal to 10% of 
GDP, and a Levine-Renelt model with investment share of 30% of GDP – to study 
convergence in central and eastern Europe. Estimates given in Table 5 were for the 
most part similar to Morita’s, which is encouraging given that different approaches 
were used to obtain them.6 
6  The following estimates of per capita GDP growth (average annual percentage changes) 
were obtained by Morita from his two models: Albania 7.1 and 6.3; Bulgaria 4.9 and 5.0; Croatia 5.4 
and 5.5; Czech Republic 5.4 and 4.4; Estonia 5.2 and 4.9; Hungary 5.3 and 5.0; Latvia 5.5 and 5.8; 
Lithuania 6.1 and 6.2; Macedonia 6.1 and 6.0; Poland 5.4 and 4.8; Romania 5.5 and 5.6; Slovakia 
5.9 and 5.0; and Slovenia 5.3 and 4.6.
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A comparison of the growth rates of real per capita GDP projected until 2020 
with actual growth rates during 1995–2003 does not reveal major discrepancies, 
either. For Albania, the Baltic states, Croatia and Poland, projected growth of GDP 
per capita is somewhat slower, refl ecting the fact that a lot of catching up in these 
countries – in particular the Baltic states – has already taken place to date. In other 
countries, projected growth of GDP per capita is the same or somewhat faster than 
the average over 1995–2003. 
Several interesting points emerge from the data in Table 5. First, potential 
growth rates in central and eastern Europe are fairly high – the average for the 16 
countries is 4.7%, almost double the average for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Second, potential growth rates are generally higher for the Baltic states and candi-
date countries (around 5½% per annum) than for the fi ve central European states 
(4½% per annum). This is not surprising given that the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia are economically more developed.
What is surprising, however, is that the estimates for the four southeast 
European countries – in particular Macedonia – are not higher. This may simply 
refl ect the fact that no adequate estimates of potential growth for these countries are 
available. As noted above, potential growth rates shown in Table 5 were obtained 
on the basis of recent historical data and projections. Estimates for Albania and 
Macedonia based on growth models (as in Morita, 1999) imply higher potential 
growth rates.  
The second point to note is that, with the exception of Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Macedonia and Turkey, all countries in central and eastern Europe 
face declining population growth rates, which are in some cases – Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Estonia, Hungary and Latvia – signifi cantly negative. This implies that future growth 
potential is lower for these countries, justifying the assumption that potential growth 
declines by quarter of a percentage point each decade. On the other hand, GDP per 
capita in these countries should grow faster, ceteris paribus, than in countries with 
positive growth of population.
Third, projected growth rates of real per capita GDP are also fairly high – with 
the exception of the Czech Republic and Macedonia, they range from 4.8% per 
annum to 6.1%. Clearly, this implies that the income gap vis-à-vis Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain should continue to narrow relatively fast.
How fast the income gap might be closed depends also on initial differences 
in per capita GDP. As shown in Table 6, the only country in central and eastern 
Europe that had a favourable initial position in this respect was Slovenia, whose 
per capita income in 2003 was equal to 70% of the average for the four southern 
EU countries. Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia had per 
capita GDP ranging from 31–44% of the EU-4 average; while Latvia, Lithuania 
and Poland were in the 10–20% range. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
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Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey were far behind, with 
per capita GDP equivalent to less than 20% of the EU-4 average. 
Table 6 shows estimates of per capita GDP in 2015, and of the time it might 
take to achieve convergence with 50% and 75%, respectively, of the average real 
per capita GDP in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. By 2015, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Hungary and Croatia might be close to or above the fi rst benchmark. 
The fi rst countries to reach the 75% benchmark – in less than 25 years – would be 
Hungary and Estonia. For Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia it might take 
more than 30 years to reach the 75% benchmark; for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania and Turkey between 40 and 55 years; and for Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro well over six decades. 
Due to the estimated low potential growth rate, Macedonia might not converge 
even to the 50% benchmark within the next century. While the estimate used in this 
paper is, admittedly, highly uncertain, it does illustrate the importance of potential 
growth for the speed of convergence. Another example is the Czech Republic. Al-
though it had the second highest per capita GDP in central and eastern Europe in 
2003 (after Slovenia), it also had the second lowest growth rate of per capita GDP, 
so that countries such as Estonia, whose per capita income is projected to grow much 
faster, would catch up with the EU-4 much sooner than the Czech Republic. 
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Table 6
CONVERGENCE OF REAL PER CAPITA INCOMES IN CENTRAL 
AND EASTERN EUROPE
Countries GDP per capita Years of convergence 
to reach 50% and 
75% of southern 
EU-4 real per capita 
GDP1
2003 2015
USD % EU4 USD % EU4 50% 75%
Czech Republic 8,370 44 12,700 51 10 46
Hungary 8,200 43 14,600 58 6 23
Poland 5,500 29 9,700 39 23 40
Slovakia 5,930 31 10,800 43 18 33
Slovenia 13,390 70 23,500 94 … 3
Estonia 6,200 32 16,600 50 12 24
Latvia 4,170 22 8,500 34 23 35
Lithuania 5,270 28 10,400 42 18 31
Bulgaria 2,550 13 5,000 20 42 55
Croatia 6,350 33 11,400 46 16 31
Romania 2,570 13 5,000 20 42 55
Turkey 3,450 18 6,500 26 33 45
Albania 1,640 9 3,200 13 55 67
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1,840 10 3,400 14 53 66
Macedonia 2,260 12 3,300 13 >85 >100
Serbia and 
Montenegro 2,480 13 4,400 17 60 79
Southern EU-4 19,110 100 25,100 100 ... ...
1 Number of years (beginning with 2003) needed to reach 50% and 75%, respectively, of average 
per
  capita GDP of Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain (southern EU-4).       
 Sources: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, IMF, OECD, United Nations, 
World Bank and national data.
5. Concluding remarks
The main purpose of analysis in this paper was to illustrate empirically proposi-
tions related to the speed of real convergence in central and eastern Europe. Clearly, 
the methodology used has severe limitations. The speed of convergence is consider-
ably more complex than the simple arithmetic of EBRD transition indices, or the 
potential GDP and population growth. Consequently, estimates presented above 
D. MIHALJEK: EU Entrants, Candidates and Aspirants: How Large Are the Differences...
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 56 (11) 975-995 (2005) 993
could be biased either upward or downward. In what follows, it will be argued that 
the likely bias is downward, ie, that countries in central and eastern Europe might 
catch up faster than estimated in this paper.
The fi rst argument relates to so-called endogeneity of convergence in economic 
and in particular monetary unions. Recent research on economic integration by 
Frankel and Rose (1998) indicates, for instance, that real convergence – in particular 
trade and factor movements as well as output correlations – may be endogenous to 
participation in an economic and monetary union. This suggests that membership in 
EU, especially if followed by a rapid accession to the European Monetary Union, 
could accelerate the pace of real convergence.
The second argument is that, even if one uses standard structural indicators, it 
is diffi cult to fi nd strong systematic differences between the countries in central and 
eastern Europe and the less wealthy members of EU-15. The share of agriculture in 
GDP is already low in most central and eastern European countries. Pelkmans et al. 
(2000) show that in terms of employment, the differences in economic structures 
are larger, particularly for Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, where a large part of 
labour force is still offi cially employed in agriculture. However, since value added 
in this sector is low and is bound to decline over time relative to the value added 
in industry and services, these differences would seem to be less relevant for the 
speed of real convergence. Nor is the share of industry in GDP notably different 
from that of many EU-15 members. Central and eastern European countries also 
have achieved considerable convergence in terms of trade structures and shares of 
intra-industry trade. 
Third, an area where signifi cant differences between central and eastern Europe 
and the EU-15 still exist and are likely to matter in foreseeable future, is that of 
institutional structures. As noted above, signifi cant catching-up has yet to be done 
even in the new member states in the areas of enterprise reform, non-bank fi nancial 
institutions, infrastructure and fi nancial regulation. As these differences get reduced 
and countries in the region attract more foreign direct investment, they are also are 
likely to converge faster to their less wealthy neighbours in the EU.  
Finally, one should note that the above estimates are not affected by the relative 
exchange rate movements over time. Because per capita growth rates are expressed 
in real terms – as potential growth rates divided by population growth – appreciation 
or depreciation of domestic currencies vis-à-vis the dollar (in which the levels of 
per capita GDP for 2003 are expressed) does not affect the speed of convergence. 
In practice, currencies of central and eastern European countries are continuously 
appreciating in real terms, refl ecting the steady revaluation of production factors 
in the region. The high growth of GDP in dollar (or euro) terms rapidly reduces 
the GDP gap between the lower-income EU-15 countries and central and eastern 
Europe. Thus, the convergence period may in the end be shorter than suggested 
by the above calculations.
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PRIDRUŽENE ČLANICE EU, KANDIDATI I «ASPIRANTI»: 
KOLIKE SU RAZLIKE MEĐU NJIMA I KAKO 
SE BRZO MOGU SMANJITI? 
Sažetak
Autor u ovome radu pokušava odgovoriti na tri pitanja o statusu realne ekonoms-
ke konvergencije u srednjoj i istočnoj Europi. Prvo, kolike su razlike mjerene ključnim 
makroekonomskim pokazateljima između novih zemalja članica koje su se pridružile EU 
u 2004,.zatim kolike su razlike između četiri kandidata za EU (Bugarska, Hrvatska, Ru-
munjska i Turska) i na kraju kolike su razlike između «aspiranata» za EU iz jugoistočne 
Europe (Albanija, Bosna i Hercegovina, Makedonija i Srbija i Crna Gora). Drugo, koliko 
bi moglo potrajati da kandidati za EU i «aspiranti» prevladaju te razlike i dostignu nove 
zemlje članice?  I treće, koliko bi trajalo da 16 zemalja u srednjoj i istočnoj Europi sustignu 
životni standard u Grčkoj, u Italiji, u Portugalu i u Španjolskoj?
Zbog složenosti usporedbi između zemalja, odgovori na ta pitanja mogu biti samo 
ilustrativni. Pokazalo se da razlike u makroekonomskim pokazateljima između kandidata za 
EU i novih zemalja članica nisu tako velike kao što se to često misli, ali je početna pozicija 
zemalja u jugoistočnoj Europi znatno slabija. Drugo, prosuđujući prema prosječnoj brzini 
reformi koju su nove zemlje članice pokazale u prošlih 15 godina, kandidatima i «aspir-
antima» bit će potrebno 1,5 -7,5 godina da dostignu razinu tranzicije koju su imale nove 
zemlje članice u vrijeme kad su se pridružile EU. Za konvergenciju pak realnog dohotka 
po stanovniku, za četiri će južna člana europske petnaestorice trebati znatno više vremena: 
između 25 i 50 godina za nove države članice (osim Slovenije) i kandidate za EU, a za 
jugoistočne europske zemlje to će potrajati 65 godina ili duže.
Ključne riječi: konvergencija; proširenje EU; rast; tranzicijske ekonomije; kandidati 
za EU; centralna i istočna Europa; jugoistočna Europa.  
